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Optimal Monetary Policy in the Presence of
Human Capital Depreciation during Unemployment
Lien Laureys1
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Abstract. When workers are exposed to human capital depreciation during periods
of unemployment, hiring affects the unemployment pool’s composition in terms
of skills, and hence the economy’s production potential. Introducing human cap-
ital depreciation during unemployment into an otherwise standard New Keynesian
model with search frictions in the labour market leads to the finding that the flexible-
price allocation is no longer constrained-efficient even when the standard Hosios
(1990) condition holds. This is because it generates a composition externality in
job creation: firms ignore how their hiring decisions affect the extent to which the
unemployed workers’ skills erode, and hence the output that can be produced by
new matches. Consequently, it might be desirable from a social point of view for
monetary policy to deviate from strict inflation targeting. Although optimal price
inflation is no longer zero, strict inflation targeting is shown to stay close to the
optimal policy.
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1 Introduction
Analysing the trade-off that monetary policymakers face between unemployment
and inflation stabilization has been a topic of interest in the literature for several
years.2 But the literature has focused primarily on an environment where workers
are homogenous, leaving it an open question whether this trade-off is altered once
worker heterogeneity is taken into account.
This paper studies an environment where human capital depreciation during unem-
ployment generates heterogeneity among ex-ante identical workers.3 This source
of heterogeneity seems particularly relevant because in its presence job creation in-
fluences the economy’s production potential. More precisely, job creation affects
the unemployment pool’s skill composition because the extent to which the unem-
ployed are exposed to human capital depreciation depends on the length of their
unemployment spell.
If aggregate shocks induce changes in the skill composition of the unemployment
pool which are not desirable from a social point of view, it might be optimal to influ-
ence job creation by allowing for more are less inflation relative to an environment
where human capital depreciation is not taken into account. Put differently, the
presence of skill erosion during unemployment might affect the trade-off between
unemployment and inflation stabilization.
The framework of analysis is an otherwise standard New Keynesian model with
search frictions in the labour market and fully flexible wages in which I have in-
troduced human capital depreciation. The latter is modelled such that workers face
the risk of losing a fraction of their productivity when being unemployed. So work-
ers who have suffered from human capital depreciation are less productive upon
re-employment than workers who have not been affected by it. At the same time,
workers can regain their initial human capital level while being employed through
2See Blanchard and Galí (2010), Faia (2009), Ravenna and Walsh (2011 and 2012a), and Thomas
(2008).
3Suggestive empirical evidence for human capital depreciation during unemployment is provided
by the displacement literature. This literature finds that displaced workers face substantial wage
losses upon re-employment which also depend on the length of the non-employment spell. See e.g.
Addison and Portugal (1989), Gregory and Jukes (2001), and Bender, Schmieder, and von Wachter
(2013).
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learning-by-doing.
I find that the presence of human capital depreciation during unemployment affects
the short-run unemployment/inflation trade-off faced by monetary policymakers.
The reason is that it generates an externality in job creation. Firms ignore how their
hiring decisions today influence the skill composition of the unemployment pool in
the next period, and hence the expected productivity of other firms’ new hires. As
a result, and in contrast to the case of no skill erosion, the flexible price allocation
is not constrained-efficient when unemployed workers face the possibility of losing
some of their skills even under the standard Hosios (1990) condition.4 Note that
the latter refers to the parameter condition for the workers’ bargaining power un-
der which the congestion externality following from search frictions in the labour
market is fully internalized, in the absence of skill erosion. Thus, optimal monetary
policy potentially deviates from strict inflation targeting because it might no longer
be desirable from a social point of view to replicate the flexible price allocation
even when the standard Hosios (1990) condition holds.
When I analyse a calibrated model quantitatively, I find that even though optimal
price inflation is no longer zero under the Ramsey policy plan, deviations from it
are almost negligible. Consequently, the prescription for the conduct of monetary
policy does not change much when it is taken into account that the unemployed
are exposed to human capital depreciation: optimal monetary policy stays close to
strict inflation targeting.
This paper reinforces the literature’s finding that unemployment/inflation trade-offs
generated by search-related distortions in the labour market only call for small devi-
ations from zero inflation. So far the search-related distortion on which the literature
has focused is the familiar congestion externality associated with search frictions.5
This paper shows that optimal monetary policy stays close to strict inflation target-
ing also in the presence of another type of search-related distortion in the labour
market, namely a composition externality following from the presence of human
capital depreciation during unemployment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model.
4See Thomas (2008) and Ravenna and Walsh (2011) for the cases with no skill erosion.
5See e.g. Faia (2009), Ravenna and Walsh (2011), and Ravenna and Walsh (2012a).
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Section 3 shows that the natural allocation is not constrained-efficient in the pres-
ence of skill erosion during unemployment. Section 4 discusses the trade-offs faced
by the monetary policymaker. Section 5 shows the economy’s responses under the
optimal monetary policy plan. Section 6 relates this paper’s finding to the literature.
Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
The economy consists of a continuum of infinitely-lived workers represented by
the unit interval who form part of a representative household. The household’s
utility depends on the consumption of home produced goods and a variety of market
goods. The latter are sold in a market characterized by monopolistic competition.
The firms operating in this market adjust their prices in a staggered way. These
goods are produced by using intermediate goods, which in turn are produced by
firms operating in a competitive environment. Intermediate good firms use labour
as input, and recruit their workers in a market with search frictions à la Diamond-
Mortensen-Pissarides. Note that the introduction of final and intermediate good
firms allows for the separation of the two main frictions in the model, namely sticky
prices and labour market frictions.6
Since the labour market is characterized by search frictions, in every period some of
the household members will be unemployed. In the presence of skill erosion during
unemployment, those unemployed workers face the risk of losing a fraction of their
skills.7 At the same time, I allow for learning-by-doing such that those workers
with eroded skills can regain them while being employed. To keep the analysis
simple, workers’ human capital can only take two values, and is either high (H)
or low (L).8 A worker’s human capital determines her productivity: high-skilled
workers have high productivity, whereas low-skilled workers have low productivity.
The transition between skill types occurs as follows. In each period, an unemployed
6This approach has been adopted by e.g. Blanchard and Galí (2010), Ravenna and Walsh (2008),
Thomas (2008), and Walsh (2005).
7This paper only focusses on general human capital and not on firm-specific human capital which
would be lost at the moment of job loss rather than during the unemployment spell.
8In what follows I use the term “skill” and “human capital” interchangeably.
3
high-skilled worker becomes low-skilled with probability l ∈ (0,1]. Thus the longer
a worker’s unemployment duration, the larger the chance that her human capital
has depreciated. At the same time, when being low-skilled, she can regain her
productivity while being employed through learning-by-doing. In each period, an
employed low-skilled worker becomes high-skilled with probability g ∈ (0,1].
2.1 Labour Market
I assume that both workers with and without eroded skills search for jobs in the
same market. Thus when a firm opens a vacancy at cost κ > 0, both worker types
can apply to this job opening. Since a firm meets at most one worker at each round
of interviews, an interview leads to successful hiring conditional on the match sur-
plus being non-negative. In every period, the total number of interviews in the
economy is determined by a matching function. This function is assumed to be
strictly increasing and concave in both arguments and to display constant returns to
scale. It is given by
m(vt ,ut) = Bv
1−ξ
t u
ξ
t
where B represents the efficiency of the matching process, 1−ξ is the elasticity of
vacancies, vt is the total number of vacancies posted by firms at time t, and ut is the
total number of job-seekers weighted by their search effectiveness. Because I as-
sume that the unemployment duration does not affect workers’ search effectiveness,
and normalizing search effectiveness to one, the relevant measure of job-seekers in
the matching function is given by the total number of unemployed. The latter is
defined as the sum of high-skilled
(
uHt
)
and low-skilled
(
uLt
)
unemployed workers
ut ≡ uHt +uLt (1)
labour market tightness θ is defined as follows
θt ≡ vtut (2)
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The probability for a firm posting a vacancy to meet a job-seeker is denoted by qt
and defined as
qt ≡ m(vt ,ut)ut = Bθt
−ξ (3)
where qt is decreasing in labour market tightness. The probability that a job-seeker
gets a job interview is denoted by pt and given by
pt ≡ m(vt ,ut)ut = Bθt
1−ξ (4)
where pt is increasing in labour market tightness. The job finding probability is
the same for both worker types because the length of an unemployment spell has
no effect on search effectiveness. When the match surplus is non-negative for both
skill types, workers also have the same hiring probability. This follows from the
assumption, which is standard for this representation of the labour market, that
each firm meets at most one worker at each round of interviews.
The timing is as follows. At the beginning of the period hiring takes place after
which both the existing and newly hired workers start producing.9 After produc-
tion some workers change type: unemployed high-skilled workers become low-
skilled with probability l, and employed low-skilled workers become high-skilled
with probability g. Finally, exogenous separation takes place, and a fraction γ of the
matches breaks up. Given this timing, the law of motion for high and low-skilled
job-seekers respectively is given by
uHt = (1− l)(1− pt−1)uHt−1+ γ
(
nHt−1+gn
L
t−1
)
uLt = (1− pt−1)
(
uLt−1+ lu
H
t−1
)
+ γ (1−g)nLt−1
The above expression shows that the high-skilled searchers at time t are all the
high-skilled job-seekers who remained unemployed at time t−1 and have not lost
their skills which happens with probability 1− l, and all the high-skilled workers
9 This timing assumption has become standard in the business cycle literature, see e.g. Blanchard
and Galí (2010).
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who just got fired. The latter are on the one hand those who were operating at time
t−1 as high-skilled workers, and on the other hand those who were low-skilled but
regained their skills because of learning-by-doing which happens with probability
g. Similarly, the low-skilled searchers at time t are previous period’s unemployed
low-skilled workers and high-skilled workers who have lost some of their skills,
and all the low-skilled workers who were employed at time t−1 but did not regain
skills and just lost their job.
The law of motion for high-skilled and low-skilled employment respectively is
given by
nHt = (1− γ)
[
nHt−1+gn
L
t−1
]
+ ptuHt (5)
nLt = (1− γ)(1−g)nLt−1+ ptuLt (6)
So high-skilled employment is given by the high-skilled and low-skilled employees
with regained skills who kept their job, and the high-skilled new hires. Similarly,
the low-skilled employed are on the one hand those who did neither regain skills
nor got fired, and on the other hand the newly hired low-skilled workers.
2.2 Households
I assume a representative household which consists of a continuum of infinitely-
lived members represented by the unit interval. A fraction of the household mem-
bers are employed, where some are high-skilled workers earning the real wage W Ht
and some are low-skilled workers earning the real wage W Lt . Whether workers are
high-skilled or low-skilled depends on their employment history. The unemployed
workers generate a value b because they engage in home production.10 The latter is
assumed to be independent of the worker’s type. Following Merz (1995), I assume
perfect insurance of unemployment risk. All workers pool their income, and hence
they all enjoy the same total consumption. This has become the standard approach
in the literature. Household’s market goods’ consumption Ct consists of a basket of
10This approach is used by Ravenna and Walsh (2008, 2011, 2012 (a) and 2012 (b)).
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differentiated goods defined by the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator
Ct ≡
 1ˆ
0
Ct(k)dk

ε
1−ε
where Ct(k) represents the quantity of final good k consumed by the household,
and ε is the elasticity of substitution between goods. Denoting the price of the
respective good by Pt (k), and assuming that there is a continuum of differentiated
goods on the unit interval, total market goods consumption expenditure is given by
1´
0
Pt (k)Ct(k)dk. Maximizing total market goods’ consumption for any given level
of expenditure implies that total expenditure equals PtCt , where Pt is an aggregate
price index
Pt ≡
 1ˆ
0
Pt(k)1−εdk
 11−ε
Note that this leads to the following demand schedule for each final good
Ct (k) =
(
Pt (k)
Pt
)−ε
Ct (7)
The household’s problem is to choose market goods’ consumption and bond hold-
ings in every period such as to maximize the following objective function
E0
∞
∑
t=0
β t U
(
CTt
)
subject to the period by period budget constraint
PtCTt +Bt ≤
(
1+ rnt−1
)
Bt−1+Pt
[
nHt W
H
t + n
L
t W
L
t +b(1−nt)
]
+Tt (8)
where β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor; U (.) is the utility function which is as-
sumed to be increasing and concave in its argument; CTt ≡ Ct + b(1−nt) defines
total consumption, being the sum of market goods’ consumption and home pro-
duction; nt ≡ nLt +nHt represents total employment, and when normalizing the size
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of the total labour force to one and abstracting from the labour market participa-
tion decision, the total amount of job-seekers who remains unemployed is given by
1−nt ; Bt are purchases of one period nominal bonds; rnt is the nominal interest rate
which determines the return on bonds; and Tt represents the lump-sum component
of income such as dividends from ownership of firms.
The household’s problem gives rise to the standard Euler equation for consumption
U ′(CTt ) = β (1+ r
n
t ) Et
{
U ′(CTt+1)
Pt
Pt+1
}
2.3 Intermediate Good Firms
I assume a continuum of intermediate good firms represented by the unit interval
and operating in a perfectly competitive market. The intermediate good firms pro-
duce a homogeneous good which is sold at the price PIt to the final good firms. Each
firm j ∈ [0,1] faces the production function
X j,t = At nej,t (9)
where X j,t is the amount of the intermediate good produced by firm j, and At is the
aggregate level of technology which follows the process
At = (1−ρa)+ρaAt−1+ εt (10)
where εt ∼ iid (0,σa), and nej,t is firm j’s effective labour input which is defined as
nej,t ≡ nHj,t +(1−δ )nLj,t
The above expression implies that a worker’s contribution to total output depends on
the worker’s skill level. The weight of a high-skilled worker is normalized to one,
whereas that of a low-skilled worker is given by 1− δ where δ can be interpreted
as the rate of human capital depreciation, and where δ ∈ (0,1].11
11 The interpretation that workers who have suffered from human capital depreciation during
unemployment are less productive upon re-employment has also been used by Pissarides (1992).
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The firm’s problem consists of choosing the effective labour force, and the number
of vacancies to post such as to maximize the objective function
E0
∞
∑
t=0
β0,t
(
PIt
Pt
At
(
nHj,t +(1−δ )nLj,t
)−nHj,t W Hj,t−nLj,t W Lj,t−κv j,t)
subject to the law of motion of high-skilled and low-skilled employment at the firm
nHj,t = (1− γ)
(
nHj,t−1+gn
L
j,t−1
)
+ v j,tqt (1− st) (11)
nLj,t = (1− γ)(1−g)nLj,t−1+ v j,tqtst (12)
where β0,t ≡ β U
′(CTt )
U ′(CT0 )
is the stochastic discount factor, and where st ≡ u
L
t
ut
represents
the fraction of low-skilled job-seekers in the unemployment pool. The firm’s profit
at time t is given by the total real revenue product minus the total real cost. The latter
contains two parts: the total wage cost and the spending on recruitment. By spend-
ing resources on recruitment the firm can adjust the existing workforce. Equation
(11) shows that high-skilled employment at time t is given by last period’s high-
skilled workers who survived separation, last period’s low-skilled workers who re-
gained skills and survived separation, and the high-skilled new hires. Similarly,
equation (12) shows that the number of low-skilled employed workers is given by
those workers who remain employed and did not regain their skills and the low-
skilled new hires. Whether the firm will end up recruiting high-skilled or low-
skilled workers depends both on the probability that a vacancy gets filled (q) and
the fraction of the respective job-seeker type in the unemployment pool (s).
I define the lagrange multiplier on constraint (11) and (12) as λ j,t and ϕ j,t respect-
ively, where λ j,t represents the real marginal value of employing a high-skilled
worker and ϕ j,t represents the real marginal value of employing a low-skilled worker.
The first order conditions with respect to v j,t , nHj,t and n
L
j,t are given by
κ
qt
= (1− st)λ j,t + stϕ j,t (13)
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λ j,t = ZHt −W Hj,t +(1− γ)Et
{
βt,t+1λ j,t+1
}
(14)
ϕ j,t = ZLt −W Lj,t +(1− γ)Et
{
βt,t+1
[
(1−g)ϕ j,t+1+gλ j,t+1
]}
(15)
where ZHt ≡ P
I
t
Pt
At and ZLt ≡ P
I
t
Pt
(1−δ )At represent the real marginal revenue product
of a high-skilled and low-skilled worker respectively. Note that the marginal value
of having a specific worker type employed is independent of the size of the firm
because of the constant returns to scale production function.
Equation (13) shows that a firm posts vacancies such that the expected hiring cost
(LHS) equals the expected gain from vacancy posting (RHS). The latter depends
on the expected real marginal value of a new hire, where the weight of each worker
type is given by its share in the unemployment pool because both worker types have
the same hiring probability. Equation (14) reflects that the real marginal value of
employing a high-skilled worker equals the real marginal revenue product gener-
ated by that worker taking into account the real wage cost, and the value gener-
ated by employing that worker in period t +1 when the match survives separation.
Just as for the high-skilled worker, the firm’s real marginal value of employing a
low-skilled worker depends on the real marginal revenue product generated by that
worker and her wage cost. However, as can be seen from equation (15), the firm
also takes into account that when this worker remains employed in the next period,
she will have regained her skills with probability g and will generate the value of a
high-skilled worker.
The total number of vacancies posted in the economy is vt =
1´
0
v j,t d j.
2.4 Final Good Firms
I assume a continuum of final good firms represented by the unit interval. Each
final good firm faces the production function
Yk,t = Xk,t (16)
where Yk,t is the final good produced by firm k, and Xk,t is the amount of interme-
diate good used as input by firm k. So the production function implies a one to one
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transformation of the intermediate good into a final good.
Final good firms operate in a monopolistically competitive market. I assume sticky
prices à la Calvo (1983) such that every period only a fraction 1− θp of the final
good firms can reset their prices, whereas the remaining fraction θp keeps their
prices unchanged. Since all firms face the same problem, all those firms who can
reset their price will choose the same one. Therefore, I drop the subscript k in what
follows to ease notation. Given that the firm’s nominal marginal cost is the price of
an intermediate good PIt , when a final good firm is able to reset its price, the firm
chooses the optimal price P?t such as to maximize
∞
∑
l=0
θ lpEt
{
β˜t,t+l
(
P?t −PIt+l
)
Yt+l|t
}
subject to the demand for the good
Yt+l|t = Y dt+l|t =
(
P?t
Pt+l
)−ε
(Ct+l +κvt+l)
where β˜t,t+l ≡ β U
′(CTt+l)
U ′(CTt )
Pt
Pt+l
is the stochastic discount factor for nominal payoffs;
Yt+l|t is the output produced at time t + l when the firm last reset its price at time t,
where the latter should equal the demand for that good to ensure market clearing;
and Pt+l is the aggregate price level at time t + l. Note that each final good firm’s
demand consists of two parts: households’ demand and intermediate good firms’
demand. The latter follows from the assumption that the vacancy posting cost κ is
in terms of the final good. Note that the demand schedule follows from the problem
of choosing the optimal consumption basket for any given level of expenditure,
where it has been assumed that the price elasticity of substitution ε is the same for
both households and intermediate good firms.
The optimal price setting rule for firm i resetting its price in period t is given by
∞
∑
l=0
θ lpEt
{
β˜t,t+l Yt+l|t (P?t −µ Pt+l MCt+l)
}
= 0 (17)
where µ ≡ εε−1 is the gross desired markup, and MCt+l ≡ PIt+l/Pt+l is the real
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marginal cost.
2.5 Wages
Wages are assumed to be renegotiated in every period between the household and
the firm. Following the literature, wages are set such that the surplus generated by
an established employment relationship is shared between the household and the
firm. The share of the surplus that each of them receives depends on their respective
bargaining power. Given that all intermediate good firms face the same problem I
drop the subscript j in what follows to ease notation.
The household’s value, expressed in terms of consumption, of having an additional
member of type i = {H,L} employed (E it ) is given by
E Ht = W
H
t +Et
{
βt,t+1
[
(1− γ+ γ pt+1)E Ht+1+ γ(1− pt+1)U Ht+1
]}
(18)
E Lt =W
L
t +Et
βt,t+1

g︸︷︷︸
regaining
(
(1− γ+ γ pt+1)E Ht+1+ γ(1− pt+1)U Ht+1
)
+ (1−g)︸ ︷︷ ︸
no regaining
(
(1− γ+ γ pt+1)E Lt+1+ γ(1− pt+1)U Lt+1
)


(19)
The value of being employed at time t depends on the wage and next period’s value.
Equation (18) and (19) show that both worker types will continue being employed
when the worker does not get fired or when the worker gets fired and immediately
rehired. If not, the worker will be unemployed, whereU it denotes the value of being
unemployed and is defined below. In the presence of learning-by-doing workers
with eroded skills also take into account that being employed today enables them to
regain their skills. Thus, as can be seen from equation (19), next period’s value for
the low-skilled workers does not only depend on their employment status but also
on whether they regained skills.
The household’s value, expressed in terms of consumption, of having an additional
member of type i unemployed at the end of the period after hiring took place
(
U it
)
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is given by
U Ht = b+Et
βt,t+1

(1− l)︸ ︷︷ ︸
no loss
(
pt+1E Ht+1+(1− pt+1)U Ht+1
)
+ l︸︷︷︸
loss
(
pt+1E Lt+1+(1− pt+1)U Lt+1
)

 (20)
U Lt = b+Et
{
βt,t+1
[
pt+1E Lt+1+(1− pt+1)U Lt+1
]}
The above expressions show that for both worker types the value of being unem-
ployed is a function of the value generated through home production and next
period’s value. Today’s unemployed workers can either become employed or re-
main unemployed in the next period. However, the presence of skill erosion dur-
ing unemployment makes high-skilled workers take into account that being unem-
ployed might lead to skill erosion, which can be seen from equation (20). If their
skills erode, which happens with probability l, they will be searching for jobs as
low-skilled workers.
The household’s surplus, expressed in terms of consumption, for having an ad-
ditional member of type i in an established employment relationship, defined as
H it ≡ E it −U it , is given by
H Ht =W
H
t −b+Et
βt,t+1
 (1− γ+ γ pt+1)H
H
t+1
−pt+1
(
l H Lt+1+(1− l) H Ht+1
)
+l
(
U Ht+1−U Lt+1
)

 (21)
H Lt =W
L
t −b+Et
βt,t+1
 (1− γ+ γ pt+1)
(
gH Ht+1+(1−g)H Lt+1
)
−pt+1H Lt+1
+g
(
U Ht+1−U Lt+1
)

 (22)
Note that the value for the firm of having a high-skilled and low-skilled worker
employed is given by λt and ϕt respectively.
The surplus generated by an employment relationship with a high and low-skilled
worker is given by MHt ≡H Ht +λt and MLt ≡H Lt +ϕt respectively. Defining the
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household’s bargaining power by η implies
H it = ηM
i
t (23)
λt = (1−η)MHt (24)
ϕt = (1−η)MLt (25)
Combining the sharing rule (equations (23)-(25)) with the expression for the house-
hold’s surplus (equations (21) and (22)) and the firm’s surplus (equations (14) and
(15)), gives the real wage for a worker of type i
W it = ηZ
i
t +(1−η)O it (26)
where O it represents the worker’s outside option
OHt ≡ b+Et
{
βt,t+1
[
η pt+1
(
(1− l− γ)MHt+1+ lMLt+1
)
−l (U Ht+1−U Lt+1)
]}
OLt ≡ b+Et
{
βt,t+1
[
η pt+1
(
(1− γ (1−g))MLt+1− γgMHt+1
)
−g(U Ht+1−U Lt+1)
]}
The wage is such that workers get a part, determined by their bargaining power η ,
of the real marginal revenue product. Moreover, workers get partially, depending
on the firm’s bargaining power, compensated for their outside option. A worker’s
outside option at time t consists of time t’s home production and the possibility of
searching for a job in period t+1. Note that high-skilled workers take into account
that if they had not been employed, they could have lost a fraction of their skills
with probability l. At the same time, workers’ outside option also reflects that even
though workers have a job today, they might have a different job next period when
they get fired and immediately rehired. Note that low-skilled workers’ take into
account that being employed today, enables them to regain their skills. Overall,
the presence of skill erosion during unemployment affects the wage because it is
reflected in the worker’s outside option that the worker’s employment status affects
her skills.
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2.6 Equilibrium
The economy’s resource constraint can be derived as follows. Aggregate demand
Y dt is given by the sum of households’ total consumption of market goods and the
total resources spent on vacancy creation by firms
Y dt =Ct +κvt
Market clearing implies that the demand of each final good firm k has to equal its
supply, i.e. Yk,t = Y dk,t . Given the production function of the final good firms (equa-
tion (16)), the production function of the intermediate good firms (equation (9)),
and the demand schedule for final goods (equation (7)), market clearing implies
1ˆ
0
Yk,tdk=At
1ˆ
0
nej,td j=At
(
nHt +(1−δ )nLt
)
=
1ˆ
0
Y dk,tdk=(Ct +κvt)
1ˆ
0
(
Pk,t
Pt
)−ε
dk
Denoting total output as Yt ≡
1´
0
Yk,tdk, the resource constraint is given by
Yt = AtnHt +At (1−δ )nLt = (Ct +κvt)∆t
where ∆t ≡
1´
0
(
Pk,t
Pt
)−ε
dk is a measure of price dispersion among final good firms.
Given that all intermediate good firms face the same problem, they all behave in the
same way. Therefore, equilibrium job creation is obtained by dropping subscript j
and combining equation (13), (24) and (25)
κ
qt
= (1−η)((1− st)MHt + stMLt )
This implies that job creation is such that the expected hiring cost (LHS) equals the
expected gains from job creation (RHS). The latter depends on the expected match
surplus generated by a new hire, taking into account the share of the surplus that the
firms will obtain 1−η . For an expression of the surplus generated by a high-skilled
and low-skilled worker in equilibrium, see equation (53) and (54) in Appendix A.
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Finally, total net supply of bonds in the economy is zero.
Definition 1: Equilibrium in this economy is defined as the path{
Yt ,Ct ,CTt ,n
H
t ,n
L
t ,nt , pt ,qt ,θt ,ut ,uLt ,uHt ,vt ,
MHt ,M
L
t ,U
H
t ,U
L
t ,Pt ,P
?
t ,Πt ,∆t ,xt ,zt ,MCt ,rnt
}∞
t=0
that satisfies equations (34)-(57) in Appendix A for all t ≥ 0, given the evolution of
the exogenous shock {εt}∞t=0, the law of motion for aggregate technology (equation
(10)), and an expression describing the conduct of monetary policy.
3 Implications of Introducing Human Capital Depre-
ciation during Unemployment
A well-known result in the literature is that in the absence of human capital depre-
ciation during unemployment, i.e. δ = 0, the decentralized allocation replicates the
constrained-efficient allocation when the distortions following from price stickiness
and monopolistic competition are offset, and when the standard Hosios (1990) con-
dition holds.12 The latter refers to the parameter condition for the workers’ bargain-
ing power under which the congestion externality following from search frictions in
the labour market is fully internalized, i.e. the workers’ bargaining power equals the
elasticity of unemployment in the matching function (η = ξ ). But in the presence
of human capital depreciation during unemployment this result no longer holds.
Proposition: In the presence of human capital depreciation during unemployment,
i.e. δ ∈ (0,1], the decentralized allocation is not constrained-efficient when the
standard Hosios (1990) condition, i.e. η = ξ , holds and distortions from price
stickiness and monopolistic competition are offset.
This proposition results from job creation in the decentralized allocation not being
optimal from a social point of view when workers’ skills erode during periods of
unemployment. This is because human capital depreciation during unemployment
generates a composition externality in job creation when firms cannot direct their
12See Thomas (2008).
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search to workers with or without depreciated human capital as shown in Laureys
(2012).13 The composition externality arises since firms’ job creation decisions
today affect the skill composition of the unemployment pool in the next period, and
hence the expected productivity of other firms’ new hires.
Proof of proposition. Throughout I assume that g = l = 1, which implies that a
worker’s productivity deteriorates with probability 1 after having been out of work
for one period, and is restored with probability 1 after having worked for one period.
This parameter condition allows for the derivation of an Euler equation for job cre-
ation such that job creation in the constrained-efficient and decentralized allocation
can be directly compared, while preserving the key feature of the skill loss process,
namely that the chance of losing skills depends on the time spent in unemployment,
and hence the hiring decision.
The constrained-efficient allocation is obtained by solving the problem of a be-
nevolent social planner who is subject to the same technological constraints and
labour market frictions as in the decentralized allocation. The planner’s problem
is outlined in Appendix B.1. Job creation in the constrained-efficient allocation is
given by
κ
qt
= (1−ξ )[At (1−δ st)−b+Et {βt,t+1ΛPt+1}] (27)
where
Et
{
ΛPt+1
}≡ Et

(1− γ)
(
κ
qt+1(1−ξ ) −ξθt+1κ
)
+(1− γ+ γ pt+1)δAt+1st+1
+pt+1δAt+1 (1− st+1)
 (28)
In the decentralized allocation in the absence of sticky prices final good firms are
able to reset their price in every period. Optimal price setting implies that each
final good firm sets his price in every period as a constant markup over its nominal
marginal cost. Taking into account that the nominal marginal cost of each final
good firm is given by the price of the intermediate good PIt , optimal price setting
13Laureys (2012) provides an analysis of the composition externality in a search and matching
model à la Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides with aggregate uncertainty and human capital depreci-
ation during unemployment.
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under fully flexible prices implies
PIt
Pt
=
1
µ
Additionally, I assume that an appropriate subsidy τ , financed through lump-sum
taxation, is implemented to offset the distortion related to monopolistic competition,
implying that 1µ(1−τ) = 1. Note that the marginal revenue product of a high-skilled
and low-skilled worker respectively, is now given by
ZHt = At
ZLt = (1−δ )At
Combining the first order conditions of the intermediate good firm’s problem (equa-
tions (13)-(15)) with the relevant expressions implied by the wage setting (equations
(24)-(26)), and imposing the standard Hosios (1990) condition (η = ξ ), gives rise
to the following expression for job creation14
κ
qt
= (1−ξ )[At (1−δ st)−b+Et {βt,t+1ΛNt+1}] (29)
where
Et
{
ΛNt+1
}≡ Et

(1− γ)
(
κ
qt+1(1−ξ ) −ξθt+1κ
)
+(1− γ+ξγ pt+1)δAt+1st+1
+ξ pt+1δAt+1 (1− st+1)
 (30)
Comparing equation (27) and (29) shows that the natural allocation is inefficient
even if the standard Hosios (1990) condition holds. In particular, the third term in
expression (28) and (30) do not coincide. 
Comparing equation (27) and (29) shows that job creation in both allocations has
the same overall structure: job creation is such that the expected hiring cost (LHS)
equals the expected gains from job creation (RHS). The latter are given by the
14See Appendix B.2 for a detailed description of the derivation.
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expected marginal revenue product of a new hire, i.e. Z¯t ≡ (1− st)ZHt + stZLt =
At (1−δ st), the loss in home production b, and the continuation value of an estab-
lished employment relationship. Note that the expected marginal revenue product
of a new hire is given by the output generated by an average job-seeker, where
the respective weights are given by that worker’s share in the unemployment pool
because all job-seekers have the same hiring probability. In the absence of skill
erosion during unemployment, i.e. for δ = 0, the continuation value consists of the
savings in vacancy posting costs when the match survives separation and a term
representing the net impact on output generated by both the congestion effect of
having a job-seeker less in the unemployment pool when the match survives sep-
aration and the worker’s outside option. This net effect is represented by the first
term in expression (28) and (30). But in the presence of skill erosion, two addi-
tional terms arise reflecting the expected future output gains related to today’s job
creation. Those output gains follow from today’s job creation enabling workers
with eroded skills to regain them and preventing high-skilled workers from losing
their skills. Next, I will discuss each part in detail.
First, as can be seen from the second term in expression (28) and (30), it is taken
into account that in case the new hire continues producing in period t + 1, today’s
job creation generates an output gain in period t+1 given by the difference between
the marginal revenue product generated by this worker and an average job-seeker.15
There is an output gain related to an established employment relationship with a
high-skilled worker because if another worker were to be hired this worker would
not necessarily be high-skilled. The less likely it is that a new hire would be high-
skilled, i.e. the lower the expected fraction of high-skilled job-seekers in the unem-
ployment pool, the higher the expected output gain. Second, it is taken into account
that employing a worker, prevents this worker from being unemployed, and hence
losing some of its skills. If the worker had not been hired in period t, the worker
would have found a job in period t+1 with probability pt+1. Given that the worker
would have lost some of her skills during her unemployment experience, hiring this
now low-skilled worker would create an output loss. This loss is given by the dif-
ference in the output generated by a low-skilled worker and the expected output of
15Note that Et
{
ZHt+1− Z¯t+1
}
= Et {δAt+1st+1}
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a new hire.16 Therefore, the expected output gain from hiring a worker, and hence
preventing a worker from skill loss, is smaller the more likely it is that a new hire
would be a worker with eroded skills.
Comparing both allocations shows that the natural allocation is inefficient even if
the standard Hosios (1990) condition holds.17 More precisely, the expected output
gains from today’s job creation, through its effect on the skills of next period’s
job-seekers, are only taken into account up to a fraction of the workers’ bargaining
power. This follows from firms ignoring two issues. First, a firm ignores how its job
creation affects the skills of those workers who are no longer employed by the firm
in period t+1. Second, a firm neglects that by not hiring a worker today, there will
be an additional worker with eroded skills in the unemployment pool next period.
These expected output gains still partially show up in the natural allocation through
the wage setting mechanism. As has been discussed in section 2.5, the workers’
outside option reflects that their employment status affects their skills, which in
turn affects the wage and ultimately job creation
4 Optimal Monetary Policy
4.1 Optimal Monetary Policy Plan
The optimal monetary policy plan is derived by solving the Ramsey problem.18
Definition 2: The policymaker’s problem consists of maximizing the welfare of the
representative household given by the objective function
E0
∞
∑
t=0
β t log
(
CTt
)
16Note that Et
{
ZLt+1− Z¯t+1
}
=−Et {δAt+1 (1− st+1)}
17In the presence of skill erosion during unemployment, the congestion externality is still offset
by the standard Hosios (1990) condition, i.e. η = ξ . Given that all job-seekers have the same
hiring probability, a change in labour market tightness will affect all job-seekers in the same way.
Therefore, there is no interaction between the congestion and the composition effect, enabling the
same condition to offset the congestion externality. For more details see Laureys (2012).
18Faia (2009) solves the Ramsey problem in a New Keynesian model with steady state distortions
caused by monopolistic competition and the standard congestion externality following from search
frictions in the labour market.
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subject to the equations (33)-(57) (in Appendix A) describing the equilibrium con-
ditions of the economy.
In general, the monetary authority faces a problem of the following format
max{et}∞t=0 E0
∞
∑
t=0
β t {U (et ,εt)+ωtEt [ f (et−1,et ,et+1,εt)]}
where et is a vector of K endogenous variables, εt represents the exogenous shocks
to the economy, ωt is a vector of Lagrange multipliers on the K−1 constraints faced
by the policymaker. The latter are given by the equilibrium conditions of the eco-
nomy: Et [ f (et−1,et ,et+1,εt)] = 0. This problem gives rise to a first order condition
with respect to every endogenous variable, which is of the following general form
For t = 0
U1 (e0,ε0)+ω0E0 [ f2 (e−1,e0,e1,ε0)]+βω1E0 [ f1 (e0,e1,e2,ε1)] = 0 (31)
For t ≥ 0
U1 (et ,εt)+ωtEt [ f2 (et−1,et ,et+1,εt)]+β−1ωt−1 f3 (et−2,et−1,et ,εt)
+βωt+1Et [ f1 (et ,et+1,et+2,εt+1)] = 0
(32)
Comparing equation (31) and (32) shows that under commitment the policy is char-
acterized by time inconsistency. At time 0, the policymaker’s optimal behavior
is determined by expression (31). Similarly, at time 1, the policymaker’s optimal
behavior under commitment is given by expression (32). Both expressions differ
because at time 0 the Lagrange multiplier ω−1 = 0, implying that the policymaker
does not need to respect what the private agents at time −1 expected the policy-
maker to do. Therefore, when a policymaker reoptimizes in period 1, the optimal
behavior will again be determined by expression (31), updated to time 1, instead
of by expression (32). In other words, the policymaker’s optimal choice for et+1 in
period t differs from the optimal choice for et+1 made when reoptimizing in period
t+1 because once arrived in period t+1 there is no need to respect what the agents
at time t were expecting the policymaker to do. To ensure that the policymaker will
act according to equation (32) in all periods, including the current one, the timeless
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perspective approach can be adopted. This implies that the policy is chosen be-
fore time 0, sometime in the distant past. Therefore, the current allocation satisfies
condition (32) because it is chosen from that earlier perspective.19
4.2 Trade-offs Faced by Monetary Policymaker
The monetary policymaker faces four sources of inefficiency: price stickiness,
monopolistic competition, the congestion externality following from search fric-
tions in the labour market and the composition externality which arises because of
skill erosion during unemployment. A monetary policymaker who has only one
instrument available will in general not be possible to eliminate all four distortions,
generating a trade-off. Below I discuss each of those frictions and their policy im-
plications in more detail.
Price stickiness distorts the economy in the following way. If all firms could reset
their price in response to shocks they would all set their price such as to achieve
their constant desired markup. As a result, the economy’s average markup in the
absence of price stickiness would be constant over time. But, when prices are sticky,
and hence not all firms can reset their prices, the economy’s average markup will
vary over time in response to shocks, making it deviate from the constant friction-
less markup. Therefore, aggregate demand, and hence output and employment will
either by too high or too low. Moreover, price stickiness also leads to price dis-
persion, which in turn leads to dispersion in demand. This generates an inefficient
allocation because it is optimal for all goods to be consumed and produced in the
same amount. The symmetry of the optimal allocation follows from all goods enter-
ing in a symmetric way in the utility function which is concave in the consumption
of those goods, and all final good firms facing the same production function. If
all the economy’s distortions besides price stickiness were to be eliminated by the
use of other policy instruments, the constrained-efficient allocation would coincide
with the natural allocation. Thus, in this case it is optimal for the policymaker to
replicate the latter, which can be done through strict inflation targeting. The find-
ing that the policymaker faces no trade-off in a New Keynesian model where price
19For more details see e.g. Walsh (2003)
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stickiness is the only distortion is a well-known result in the literature.20 Blanchard
and Galí (2007) labeled this property the divine coincidence.
Each of the other sources of inefficiency, however, makes the natural allocation no
longer coincide with the constrained-efficient allocation. Hence, from a social point
of view it might no longer be optimal to conduct a zero inflation policy and replicate
the natural allocation. The latter becomes inefficient when one of the other distor-
tions is present for the following reason. First, firms operating in a market charac-
terized by monopolistic competition have some market power which makes them
charge prices above their marginal cost. As a result, demand for the final goods,
and hence output and employment in the natural allocation are too low from the
planner’s perspective. Second, the presence of search frictions in the labour market
renders job creation and output inefficient when the congestion externality is not
fully internalized. This happens if the standard Hosios (1990) condition (η = ξ )
does not hold. When the only source of inefficiency is the congestion externality,
job creation in the natural allocation is too high or too low depending on the rela-
tion between the worker’s bargaining power (η) and the elasticity of job-seekers in
the matching function (ξ ). On the one hand, when η < ξ job creation is too at-
tractive for firms, causing job creation, and hence the supply of intermediate goods
being too high. On the other hand, job creation is too low when η > ξ because
job creation is not attractive enough for firms. Finally, as discussed in section 3,
the composition externality makes job creation, and hence output and employment
in the natural allocation become inefficient because there are gains related to job
creation which are not internalized.
Given that offsetting the distortion from price stickiness calls for zero inflation,
whereas offsetting each of the other distortions requires time-varying inflation, the
policymaker faces a trade-off between the economy’s distortions. Consequently,
20In a New Keynesian model where price stickiness is the only distortion the policymaker faces
no trade-off because stabilizing inflation implies the stabilization of the welfare relevant output
gap. The latter refers to the difference between the output produced in the decentralized and the
constrained-efficient allocation. In such an environment, and in the absence of cost-push shocks, the
constrained-efficient allocation always coincides with the natural allocation. Therefore replicating
the natural allocation by conducting a zero inflation policy automatically leads to the stabilization of
the welfare relevant output gap. See e.g. Galí (2008) for a more detailed discussion about optimal
monetary policy in a standard New Keynesian framework.
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I expect optimal monetary policy to deviate from strict inflation targeting in the
presence of skill erosion during unemployment, even if the distortions from mono-
polistic competition and the congestion effect are eliminated through the use of an
adequate subsidy and by imposing the standard Hosios (1990) condition.
5 Dynamics
In this section I present the economy’s response under the optimal monetary policy
plan when the economy is subject to aggregate technology shocks.21 To gain insight
into the trade-off for the policymaker generated by the composition externality, I
offset the distortions from monopolistic competition and the standard congestion
externality following from search frictions. The distortion related to monopolistic
competition is shut down in the same way as in section 3, namely by assuming
the implementation of an appropriate subsidy, whereas the congestion externality is
internalized by imposing the standard Hosios (1990) condition (η = ξ ).
5.1 Calibration
The length of a period is set to one quarter. I calibrate the model to the U.S. eco-
nomy. Following the literature, I set the discount discount factor β to 0.99, the
elasticity of substitution ε to 6, the parameter θp governing the degree of price
stickiness to 2/3, and the elasticity of unemployment in the matching function to
0.5. Workers’ bargaining power η is also set to 0.5 such that the standard Hosios
(1990) condition holds. Following Ravenna and Walsh (2011) the value of home
production b is such that the replacement ratio equals 0.54. Given the two types of
workers, I use the average wage in steady state to compute the replacement ratio:
b
W˜
= ψ , where ψ denotes the replacement ratio and W˜ ≡ NHNH+NLW H + N
L
NH+NLW
L.
Following Ravenna and Walsh (2011), the steady state job filling probability q(θ)
21The economy’s behavior under the optimal monetary policy plan is compute by using Dyn-
are. The first order conditions characterizing the Ramsey problem, as outlined in section 4.1, are
derived after which this system of equations characterizing the equilibrium is solved by first order
perturbation.
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is set to 0.9 . Following Blanchard and Galí (2010), I set steady state employment
n to 0.95, which implies an unemployment rate u˜ ≡ (1− p(θ))u of 0.05. Also
following Blanchard and Galí (2010), I set the steady state job finding probability
p(θ) to 0.7. This implies that the separation rate γ = u˜p(θ)/((1− u˜)(1− p(θ)))
equals 0.12. Given these values, the value for the efficiency of the matching func-
tion B can be obtained as follows. Steady state labour market tightness is given by
θ = p(θ)/q(θ) = 0.778. This in turn implies a value of B = p(θ)θ ξ−1 = 0.794.
The value for the parameter governing the vacancy posting costs κ can be com-
puted from the equilibrium conditions once the parameters for the skill loss process
are determined. Following Ravenna and Walsh (2011), I set the standard deviation
of the technology shock such that the standard deviation of output is 1.82 percent
conditional on a policy of price stability. The autoregressive coefficient ρa is set to
0.95.
The parameters governing the skill loss process are δ , l, and g. The parameters δ
and l determine the degree to which an unemployment spell erodes workers’ skills:
the human capital depreciation rate δ determines how many skills a high-skilled
worker loses conditional upon losing, whereas the probability that a high-skilled
worker will lose some of its skills in each period that she spends in unemployment
depends on l. The parameter g determines how long it takes on average for a worker
with eroded skills to regain those skills. Given the absence of empirical evidence on
those parameter values, I look at the economy’s behavior for a range of parameter
values. When I vary one of those parameters over a certain range, I keep the other
parameters fixed at an arguably reasonable baseline value. In particular, I set g =
l = 0.5 such that it takes on average 2 quarters for workers to lose and regain skills,
and δ = 0.3 which makes workers who have suffered from skill erosion 30% less
productive than before skill loss.
5.2 Results
Figures 1-3 show the optimal standard deviation (in percent) of inflation as a func-
tion of the rate of human capital depreciation (δ ), the time it takes on average for
workers’ skills to erode (1/l), and the time it takes on average for workers with
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Variable Variable Value
Discount factor β 0.99
Elasticity of Substitution ε 6
Price stickiness θp 2/3
Replacement ratio b
W˜
0.54
Vacancy Elasticity of Matches 1−ξ 0.5
Bargaining power workers η 0.5
Employment n 0.95
Job finding rate p(θ) 0.7
Vacancy filling rate q(θ) 0.9
Table 1: Parameterization
eroded skills to regain them (1/g). These figures depict the overall pattern: the
more costly skill loss (i.e. the higher δ , the higher l, and the lower g), the more
volatile is inflation under the optimal policy. However, in addition to this pattern,
those figures also show that for all values of the parameters governing the skill loss
process the optimal volatility of inflation stays very close to zero. In other words,
if skill erosion during unemployment is the only source of inefficiency, optimal
monetary policy stays close to strict inflation targeting.
This is also confirmed by figure 4 which depicts the impulse response functions of
the economy both under the Ramsey optimal policy and a zero inflation policy when
the economy is hit by a persistent negative aggregate technology shock causing an
initial decrease of aggregate technology of 1% relative to its steady state value. The
response of the unemployment rate and the fraction of low-skilled job-seekers in
the unemployment pool is expressed as the absolute deviation from its steady state
level (in percentage points), while the response of the marginal cost and inflation is
expressed as the relative deviation from its steady state level (in percent). It can be
seen that even though optimal price inflation is no longer zero, it stays very close
to it. This immediately explains why the impulse response functions of the un-
employment rate and the fraction of low-skilled job-seekers in the unemployment
pool nearly coincide under both policies. Under the optimal policy the real marginal
cost faced by the final good firms goes down an impact. This can be explained when
looking at the nature of the externality generated by skill erosion during unemploy-
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ment. Laureys (2012) shows that this externality can be offset by implementing a
procyclical employment subsidy, reflecting that when the composition externality
is the only source of inefficiency overall job creation is too low from a social point
of view but less so in recessions than in booms. As can be seen from equation (13),
the intermediate good firms’ job creation depends positively on the real marginal
revenue product generated by the newly hired worker. This real marginal revenue
product in turn depends positively on the real marginal cost faced by the final good
firms. Therefore, a drop on impact of the real marginal cost faced by the final good
firms decreases the gains from job creation. This in turn implies that the response
of the marginal cost is in line with what is expected from the findings in Laureys
(2012). But for the specific parameter values of the skill loss process the tiny drop
on impact of the real marginal cost is not enough to generate a drop on impact of
price inflation.
Finally, figures 5-7 show the economy’s impulse response functions under the Ram-
sey optimal policy for different values of the parameters governing the skill loss
process. The economy is hit by a persistent negative aggregate technology shock
causing an initial decrease of aggregate technology of 1% relative to its steady state
value. These figures show, in line with figures 1-3, that optimal price inflation
barely deviates from zero. Despite the finding that the real marginal cost drops on
impact for all parameter values in line with the discussion above, price inflation
either increases or decreases on impact depending on the parameter values govern-
ing the skill loss process. This is because the response on impact of price inflation
depends on the path of the real marginal cost.
6 Relation to the Literature
This paper finds that in the presence of skill erosion during unemployment, and
flexible wages, optimal monetary policy stays close to strict inflation targeting. This
result is in line with the finding in the literature that search-related distortions in the
labour market only call for small deviations from zero inflation. In contrast, optimal
monetary policy is no longer close to a zero inflation policy when labour market
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distortions are related to wage rigdity. Thomas (2008) builds a New Keynesian
framework with labour market frictions where the Hosios (1990) condition holds
such that both the steady state and the unemployment fluctuations are constrained-
efficient in the natural allocation. He finds that optimal monetary policy deviates
from strict inflation targeting when nominal wage bargaining is staggered instead
of flexible. The reason is that by allowing for inflation real wages can be brought
closer to their flexible wage counterpart. In a similar setup, Blanchard and Galí
(2010) find that the presence of real wage rigidity also calls for deviations from
zero inflation. Even though the policymaker can no longer bring wages closer to
their flexible wage counterpart, hiring incentives can be affected by allowing for
inflation. This in turn reduces the economy’s welfare losses.
The literature has only focused on the search-related distortion in the labour mar-
ket following from a failure of the standard Hosios (1990) condition to hold. Faia
(2009) analyses optimal monetary policy in an economy characterized by distor-
tions from monopolistic competition, quadratic costs of price adjustment, and match-
ing frictions in the labour market under deviations from the Hosios (1990) condi-
tion. She finds that under the Ramsey optimal policy the deviation of price infla-
tion from zero should be larger, the higher the workers’ bargaining power relative
to the elasticity of unemployment in the matching function. This finding follows
from the incentives for firms to post vacancies becoming smaller when the work-
ers’ bargaining power increases, which makes unemployment fluctuate above its
constrained-efficient level. However, those optimal deviations from zero inflation
are small. Ravenna and Walsh (2011) use the linear-quadratic approach to compute
optimal monetary policy in an economy with sticky prices à la Calvo, matching
frictions in the labour market, and an efficient steady state. The trade-off for the
policymaker, and hence the potential deviation from zero inflation is generated by
the presence of shocks to workers’ bargaining power. Those shocks imply a de-
viation from the Hosios (1990) condition, which makes job creation in the natural
allocation inefficient. They find that the labour market structure has important im-
plications for optimal monetary policy in the sense that ignoring the structure of the
labour market, and hence implementing policy rules based on an incorrect percep-
tion of the nature of the welfare costs generated by labour market frictions, might
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lead to important welfare losses. However, they also find that zero inflation is nearly
optimal.
Ravenna and Walsh (2012a) have analysed why a zero inflation policy remains close
to being the optimal policy even though the presence of search frictions in the labour
market can lead to significant welfare losses. They argue that optimal monetary
policy deviates little from strict inflation targeting because monetary policy is not
the appropriate instrument to address the inefficiency arising from a failure of the
Hosios (1990) condition. This argument is based on their finding that the optimal
tax to eliminate this inefficiency is large in the steady state but moves little over the
cycle.
This paper reinforces the literature’s finding by showing that optimal monetary
policy stays close to strict inflation targeting also in the presence of another type
of search-related distortion in the labour market. The finding that optimal monetary
policy stays close to strict inflation targeting in the presence of skill erosion during
unemployment can potentially be explained along the lines of Ravenna and Walsh
(2012a). In Laureys (2012) I show that, in the presence of fully flexible prices, the
optimal labour market policy which restores constrained-efficiency in the presence
of skill loss during unemployment takes the form of a time-varying employment
subsidy. But the difference between the labour market outcomes in the presence
of the optimal labour market policy and in the laissez-faire economy is in the first
place driven by a difference in the steady state. This in turn might explain why op-
timal monetary policy stays close to strict inflation targeting in the presence of skill
erosion during unemployment despite the fact the natural allocation is no longer
constrained-efficient.
7 Conclusion
This paper looks at how the prescription for conducting monetary policy changes
once it is taken into account that workers’ human capital depreciates during periods
of unemployment. Human capital depreciation during unemployment is introduced
into an otherwise standard New Keynesian model with search frictions in the la-
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bour market. Skill erosion has potential implications for optimal monetary policy
because in its presence the flexible-price allocation is not constrained-efficient. This
is a consequence of a composition externality related to job creation: firms ignore
how their hiring decisions affect the extent to which the unemployed workers’ skills
erode, and hence the output that can be produced by new matches. Therefore, from
a social point of view it might no longer be optimal to replicate the flexible-price
allocation by implementing a strict inflation targeting policy.
I find that even though optimal price inflation is no longer zero, strict inflation
targeting stays close to the optimal policy. This result reinforces the existing finding
in the literature that search-related distortions in the labour market only call for
small deviations from zero inflation. The literature, however, has only looked at
search-related distortions following from the familiar congestion externality that
arises in markets characterized by search frictions. My paper shows that this finding
is generalized for other search-related distortions.
One aspect which should be pointed out is that in this paper’s framework firms are
still willing to hire workers with depreciated human capital. This is because those
workers’ wages are adjusted downwards to bring them in line with their lower pro-
ductivity. Therefore, in an environment where wages are rigid and human capital
depreciation is sufficiently severe, firms might no longer be willing to hire those
workers. As a result, hiring decisions would not only affect the quality of the unem-
ployment pool but also the share of the workforce that is perceived as employable.
This would generate an additional source of inefficiency, and hence affect the short-
run unemployment/inflation trade-off faced by monetary policymakers. I leave this
analysis for future research.
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A Equilibrium
The economy’s equilibrium is determined by the following equations
Evolution of aggregate technology
At = (1−ρa)+ρaAt−1+ εt (33)
Total output
Yt = AtnHt +At (1−δ )nLt (34)
Total consumption
CTt =Ct +b(1−nt) (35)
Euler equation for consumption
(
CTt
)−1
= β (1+ rnt ) Et
{(
CTt+1
)−1 Pt
Pt+1
}
(36)
Resource constraint
Yt = (Ct +κvt)∆t (37)
Inflation
Πt =
Pt
Pt−1
(38)
Price setting
xt = (Ct +κvt)MCt (1− τ)+θpβEt
{(
CTt
CTt+1
)
(Πt+1)ε xt+1
}
(39)
zt = (Ct +κvt)+θpβEt
{(
CTt
CTt+1
)
(Πt+1)ε−1 zt+1
}
(40)
P?t
Pt
zt =
ε
ε−1xt (41)
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Law of motion aggregate price level
1 = θpΠε−1t +(1−θp)
(
P?t
Pt
)1−ε
(42)
Law of motion price dispersion
∆t = (1−θp)
(
P?t
Pt
)−ε
+θp (Πt)ε ∆t−1 (43)
Job finding probability
pt = Bθ
1−ξ
t (44)
Job filling probability
qt = Bθ
−ξ
t (45)
Labor market tightness
θt =
vt
ut
(46)
Total number of job-seekers
ut = 1− (1− γ)nt−1 (47)
Total employment
nt = nLt +n
H
t (48)
Law of motion high-skilled and low-skilled employment respectively
nHt = (1− γ)
[
nHt−1+gn
L
t−1
]
+ ptuHt (49)
nLt = (1− γ)(1−g)nLt−1+ ptuLt (50)
Law of motion high-skilled and low-skilled job-seekers respectively
uHt = (1− l)(1− pt−1)uHt−1+ γ
(
nHt−1+gn
L
t−1
)
(51)
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uLt = (1− pt−1)
(
uLt−1+ lu
H
t−1
)
+ γ (1−g)nLt−1 (52)
Surplus generated by a high-skilled worker
MHt = MCtAt−b+Et
βt,t+1
 (1− γ+ηγ pt+1)M
H
t+1
−η pt+1
(
lMLt+1+(1− l)MHt+1
)
+l
(
U Ht+1−U Lt+1
)

 (53)
Surplus generated by a low-skilled worker
MLt =MCt (1−δ )At−b+Et
βt,t+1
 (1− γ+ηγ pt+1)
(
gMHt+1+(1−g)MLt+1
)
−η pt+1MLt+1
+g
(
U Ht+1−U Lt+1
)


(54)
Household’s value from having an additional high-skilled and low-skilled member
unemployed respectively
U Ht = b+Et
{
βt,t+1
[
η pt+1
(
(1− l)MHt+1+ lMLt+1
)
+(1− l)U Ht+1+ lU Lt+1
]}
(55)
U Lt = b+Et
{
βt,t+1
[
η pt+1MLt+1+U
L
t+1
]}
(56)
Vacancy creation condition
κ
qt
= (1−η)
((
1− u
L
t
ut
)
MHt +
uLt
ut
MLt
)
(57)
The 26 endogenous variables are:
{
At ,Yt ,Ct ,CTt ,n
H
t ,n
L
t ,nt , pt ,qt ,θt ,ut ,uLt ,uHt ,vt ,
MHt ,M
L
t ,U
H
t ,U
L
t ,Pt ,P
?
t ,Πt ,∆t ,xt ,zt ,MCt ,rnt
}
To close the system, the conduct of monetary policy has to be determined.
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B Special case: l=g=1
B.1 Constrained-efficient allocation
The constrained-efficient allocation is obtained by solving the problem of a bene-
volent social planner. The social planner maximize the utility of the representative
household and faces the same technological constraints and labor market frictions
as in the decentralized economy. When choosing the optimal allocation, the social
planner internalizes the effect of vacancy posting on both labor market tightness and
on the quality of the labor force.The social planner’s problem consist of choosing
optimal labor market tightness or vacancy creation and is given by
V P(nt−1) = max
θt
[
U(CTt )+βEt
{
V P(nt)
}]
subject to the law of motion of total employment
nt = (1− γ)nt−1+Bθ 1−ξt (1− (1− γ)nt−1)
and where total consumption is given by the sum of consumption of home and
non-home produced goods CTt =Ct + b(1− nt) ; where the consumption of home
produced is all output produced minus that fraction of output that is used for va-
cancy creation Ct = At
(
nHt +(1−δ )nLt
)−κθtut ; where high-skilled employment
is given by nHt = (1− γ)nt−1 + Bθ 1−ξt γnt−1; where low-skilled employment is
given by nLt = Bθ
1−ξ
t (1−nt−1); and where the total number of job-seekers is given
by ut = 1− (1− γ)nt−1.
The first-order condition with respect to labor market tightness is
u′(CTt )
[
At (1−δ st)− κq(θt)(1−ξ ) −b
]
+βEt
{
∂V P(nt)
∂nt
}
= 0
The envelope condition of employment is
∂V P(nt−1)
∂nt−1
= u′(CTt )
[
∂Ct
∂nt−1
−b ∂nt
∂nt−1
]
+βEt
{
∂V P(nt)
∂nt
∂nt
∂nt−1
}
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Combining the above expressions gives rise to the condition for job-creation in the
constrained-efficient allocation given by equation (27) in section 3.
B.2 Decentralized allocation for l=g=1
The intermediate good firm’s problem is the same as the one described in section
2.4. For l = g = 1 the first order conditions become
κ
qt
= (1− st)λ j,t + stϕ j,t (58)
λ j,t = ZHt −W Hj,t +(1− γ)Et
{
βt,t+1λ j,t+1
}
(59)
ϕ j,t = ZLt −W Lj,t +(1− γ)Et
{
βt,t+1λ j,t+1
}
(60)
Combining the above expressions gives the following expression for firm’s vacancy
creation
κ
qt
= Z¯t−W¯j,t +(1− γ)Et
{
βt,t+1
[
κ
qt+1
+gHj,t+1
]}
(61)
where
gHj,t ≡
(
ZHt −W Hj,t
)− (Z¯t−W¯j,t)
where Z¯t ≡ (1− st)ZHt + stZLt represents the expected marginal revenue product of
a new hire. It is defined as the weigthed sum of the marginal revenue product of a
high-skilled and low-skilled worker. Each type’s share in the unemployment pool
is sufficient to determine this type’s weight because all job- seekers have the same
hiring probability; and where W¯j,t ≡ (1− st)W Hj,t + stW Lj,t represents the expected
wage cost of a new hire.
Next, the wage setting mechansim is the same as the one outlined in section 2.5.
For l = g = 1 the wage of a worker of type i is given by
W it = ηZ
i
t +(1−η)
(
b+ηEt
{
βt,t+1
[
pt+1MLt+1− γ pt+1MHt+1
] })
(62)
Finally, the condition for job creation in equilibrium can be obtained as follows.
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First, by combining equations (58)-(60) and equation (62), the value for a firm of
having a high-skilled and a low-skilled worker employed becomes
λt =
κ
qt
+(1−η)(ZHt − Z¯t)
ϕt =
κ
qt
+(1−η)(ZLt − Z¯t)
The equilibrium wage of a worker of type i is obtained by combining the above
expression with the relation between the value for the firm and the total match
surplus implied by the wage setting mechanism (equation (24) and (25) in section
2.5) and the expression for the wage (equation (62))
W it =ηZ
i
t +(1−η)b+(1−η)Et
βt,t+1
 η pt+1( κqt+1(1−η) +ZLt+1− Z¯t+1)
−ηγ pt+1
(
κ
qt+1(1−η) +Z
H
t+1− Z¯t+1
)  
Combining the above expression for the wage with the vacancy creation condition
(equation (61)) gives the following expression for equilibrium job creation
κ
qt
= (1−η)[Z¯t−b+Et {βt,t+1ΛDt+1}] (63)
where
Et
{
ΛDt+1
}≡ Et

(1− γ)
(
κ
qt+1(1−η) +Z
H
t+1− Z¯t+1− η(1−η)θt+1κ
)
+η pt+1
[
γ
(
ZHt+1− Z¯t+1
)
+
(
Z¯t+1−ZLt+1
)]

Note that for g = l = 1, the economy’s equilibrium is defined by equation (34)-
(52) and the job creation condition described by equation (63), given a path for the
exogoneous shock {εt}∞t=0 and the conduct of monetary policy.
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C Figures
Figure 1: Optimal volatility of inflation (in percent) as a function of the rate of
human capital depreciation δ
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Figure 2: Optimal volatility of inflation (in percent) as a function of the pace of skill
loss (1/l)
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Figure 3: Optimal volatility of inflation (in percent) as a function of the pace of
regaining skills (1/g)
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Figure 4: Impulse responses of selected variables under the Ramsey policy and the
zero inflation policy to a 1% negative aggregate technology shock for δ = 0.3 and
g = l = 0.5
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Figure 5: Impulse responses of selected variables under the Ramsey policy to a 1%
negative aggregate technology shock for different rates of human capital depreci-
ation, and where g = l = 0.5
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Figure 6: Impulse responses of selected variables under the Ramsey policy to a 1%
negative aggregate technology shock for different values of the probability of skill
loss, and where δ = 0.3 and g = 0.5
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Figure 7: Impulse responses of selected variables under the Ramsey policy to a
1% negative aggregate technology shock for different values of the probability of
regaining skills, and where δ = 0.3 and l = 0.5
0 5 10 15 20
−6
−4
−2
0
2
x 10
−3
quarters
Marginal cost
g=0.99
g=0.33
0 5 10 15 20
−5
0
5
10
15
x 10
−4
quarters
Inflation (%)
g=0.99
g=0.33
0 5 10 15 20
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
quarters
Unemployment rate (%)
g=0.99
g=0.33
0 5 10 15 20
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
quarters
Fraction of low−skilled searchers (%)
g=0.99
g=0.33
45
